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Abstract
This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an 
objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy 
(’Swinburnian theism’). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists 
cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal. My paper will develop this 
criticism along two lines: first, that personhood requires contentful mental states, 
which in turn necessitate the membership of a linguistic community, and second that 
personhood requires limitation within a wider context constitutive of the ’setting’ 
of the agent’s life. Pantheism can, I argue, satisfy neither criterion of personhood. 
At this point the tables are turned on the Swinburnian theist. If the pantheist cannot 
defend herself against the personhood-based attacks, neither can the Swinburnian, 
and for instructively parallel reasons: for neither doctrine is God in the material 
world; in the pantheist case God is identical with the world, in the Swinburnian case 
God transcends it. Either way both the pantheist and the Swinburnian are left with a 
dilemma: abandon divine personhood or modify the doctrine of God so as to block 
the move to personhood.
Keywords Pantheism · Divine personhood · Apophaticism · Divine language
Is God a person? Since the advent of philosophy of religion in the analytic tradi-
tion the consensus of opinion has favoured answering this question in the affirma-
tive (as we will see in due course). I think that this response is wrong; God is not 
 * Simon Hewitt 
 s.hewitt@leeds.ac.uk
1 School of Philosophy, Religion, and the History of Science, University of Leeds, 
Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
 International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
1 3
a person. The purpose of this paper is to trace a new route to this ancient conclu-
sion1. Harnessing a revival of interest in alternative concepts of deity (Buckareff and 
Nagasawa 2016), in what follows I flesh out and defend the personhood argument 
against pantheism.2 This allows us to get a relatively uncontroversial handle on the 
kind of reasons which might be thought to count against God being a person, in the 
context of a pantheistic concept of God. The innovation of the present paper consists 
in making a transition from the context of pantheism to that of standard analytic the-
ism, and arguing that exactly the same reasons which count against personhood in 
the pantheistic case undermine personhood here too. The result is a cumulative case 
against divine personhood.
The personhood argument for pantheism proceeds on the basis of the claimed 
incompatibility of two claims which it will be useful to set out for future reference:
(1) God is everything.
(2) God is a person.
I think that it indeed cannot be the case that (1) and (2) are both true. However, 
I want to argue that this should not be a source of comfort for the mainstream of 
analytic theism (which I will call ‘Swinburnian theism’). The Swinburnian the-
ist affirms (2) whilst denying (1). This, I will argue is an untenable position, since 
arguments showing that (1) is incompatible with (2) also show that key Swinbur-
nian claims are incompatible with (2). Both sides therefore face a choice: revise the 
operative understanding of God, or reject divine personhood. An engagement with 
pantheism, then, provides a novel vantage point from which to assess a standard 
position in philosophical theism.
I’ll proceed as follows. §1 lays out the conceptual terrain, offering a working 
definition of pantheism and discussing reasons for assent to divine personhood. §2 
describes the personhood challenge to pantheism in broad terms, whilst §3 enquir-
ies into what it means to classify some entity as a person. Then in the following two 
sections the personhood challenge is developed along two lines: §4 argues that per-
sonhood requires potential membership of a linguistic community, which God—as 
understood according to (1)—cannot possess; §5 suggests that personhood neces-
sitates having a life context, which again the God of (1) cannot have. I go on in §6 
to make the case that the arguments of §4 and §5 tell equally against Swinburnian 
theism. A conclusion draws morals for the philosophy of religion, identifying some 
choice points and suggesting future directions of enquiry.
2 Pantheism is touched on, both historically and with respect to contemporary perfect being theism in 
Nagasawa (2017, Ch. 1).
1 It’s actually cheating somewhat to call the position ancient, since the modern concept of personhood 
in terms of which it is formulated was not available to ancient and medieval thinkers. I hope that readers 
will allow me the counterfactual: the other commitments of pseudo-Dionysius, Maimodies, Aquinas and 
so on show us that had they possession of the relevant concept of personhood they would have denied 
that God is a person.
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Pantheism and personhood
The term ‘pantheism’ is somewhat vague in its application. Mander’s Stanford 
Encyclopedia entry tells us that it ‘should not be thought of as a single codifiable 
position’ (Mander 2016). In order to engage rigorously with the topic, however, it is 
helpful to have a unitary working definition. The obvious one is,
(3) Everything is God.
However, the devil is in the detail. The reading of this as ∀x x = g , where ‘g’ names 
God, is clearly not the intended one. As a poetic utterance ‘we are all gods’ might 
have something going for it,3 but it dubious that it has merits as a claim about real-
ity.4 The pantheist instead intends something like:
(4) God is identical with the maximal mereological sum
Indeed Oppy takes (4) to be definitional of pantheism (Oppy 1997). It would be 
peculiar if this were exactly right: is the pantheist really committed in virtue of her 
pantheism to there being a maximal mereological sum? That such a sum exists is 
a consequence of mereological universalism, at least in the presence of absolutely 
general quantification, and the pantheist certainly needn’t sign up to that; but need 
she even admit the existence of a world-sum?5 If we can make sense of the idea of 
non-mereological composition—invoked, for instance, by Armstrong in his account 
of states-of-affairs (Armstrong 1997)—then perhaps the pantheist could hold coher-
ently that every non-divine entity composes God in a non-mereological fashion. 
This said we will set these considerations to one side in what follows and work with 
(4) as definitive of pantheism. Whilst discussions of how best to formulate panthe-
ism are interesting, and of some importance for philosophical engagement with the 
doctrine, I do not think that anything which follows here turns on the precise details 
of formulation.
It is a corollary of (4) that everything is a part of God and that everything other 
than God is a proper part of God. This, I think, captures what is intended by panthe-
istic claims to the effect that everything is divine. Every entity is overlapped by God; 
there is, so to speak, nothing which lies beyond God’s mereological remit.
So much for pantheism. Now to address the second side of the dilemma we’ll be 
setting up: what reasons are there to suppose that God is a person? It could be taken 
to be simply analytic of the concept God that God is a person. After all, the word 
‘God’ functions like a personal proper name, typically taking personal pronouns as 
anaphoric co-referrers. That personhood is definitional of God is a commonplace 
assumption in philosophy. Swinburne tells us that God is,
3 Thus Kate Tempest:
 The gods are in the betting shops
 the gods are in the caff
 the gods are smoking fags out the back. (Tempest 2013, 3)
4 The nearest position might be what Oppy terms ‘distributive pantheism’—that every entity is divine 
(Oppy 1997, 325).
5 Mereological universalism being the position that for any plurality xx there is a fusion of the xx.
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a person without a body (i.e. a spirit), present everywhere, the creator and sus-
tainer of the universe, a free agent, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), 
knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, 
eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. (Swinburne 2016, 2)
Nor is this position confined to those who think that God exists. Mackie accepts 
Swinburne’s definition of God and goes on to argue that theism is unwarranted 
(Mackie 1982, 1–2).
More substantially, numerous religious texts present God as exhibiting character-
istically personal qualities. The foundational texts of all of the monotheistic religions 
contain accounts of God speaking, undergoing emotions, performing actions, listen-
ing to prayer and so on. Moreover standard beliefs about God, whether derived from 
religious texts or not, seem to imply personhood: think here of the belief that God 
is omniscient, and therefore a knower, or that God is omnibenevolent, and therefore 
good. In this vein, Plantinga, arguing against the doctrine of divine simplicity, which 
he takes (in my view wrongly), to entail that God is a property, writes,
This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No prop-
erty could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, 
know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere 
abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. (Plantinga 
1980, 47)
The thought here is that characteristic, and religiously important, states attributed 
to God necessitate divine personhood. Therefore—given, presumably, that we have 
justifying reason to believe that these states obtain—we should believe that God is 
a person. For present purposes, it is worth noting that the attribution of apparently 
personal states to God is not confined to thinkers who deny pantheism; Spinoza has 
it that God is an ‘infinite intellect’.
Human actions in respect of God provide another reason for taking God to be a 
person. In particular the practice of prayer might be thought to be intelligible only 
against the background of belief in divine personhood. For is not prayer a form of 
communication with God? In praying, believers ask things of God, in the hope that 
God will act; they worship God; bare their souls to God, and aspire to grow closer 
to God. These might appear to be paradigmatically person-directed activities. It is 
intelligible that I do all of these things with respect to my head of department (even 
if it might be doubted that, for all her admirable qualities, she quite warrants wor-
ship). If I appeared to be doing them with respect to my toaster, you would not know 
what to make of me. Only a person, on this view, can be the object of religious devo-
tion; God is the object of religious devotion, therefore God is a person.
Happily, given what is to follow, I do not think that any of these considerations 
in favour of divine personhood are decisive. They do, however, represent a common 
current of opinion both inside and outside the academy. The claim that God is a per-
son is a force to be reckoned with in the philosophy of religion, and in particular it 
seems to present a difficulty for pantheism as we will now see.
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The personhood challenge
Here is the personhood challenge in microcosm: the maximal mereological sum is not 
the right kind of thing to be a person. As a succinct statement of, what I take to be, 
widespread intuition this is no substitute for an argument.6 We need to flesh out the bare 
bones in order to have something deserving of being called a challenge to pantheism.
As a first move in this direction we might consider what is behind the thought 
that God is not the right kind of thing to be a person. Our concept of personhood is 
acquired in association with application to human beings, indeed the word ‘person’ 
seems to function as a synonym for ‘human being’ in many circumstances: ‘who 
was that person I saw on the train last Thursday?’ Whilst no attempt to supply neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for personhood has commanded anything like univer-
sal assent, many efforts in this direction have considered distinctively animal, if not 
human, characteristics to be necessary for personhood.7 Most obviously, animalist 
accounts have this feature, but so do ones in the Lockean tradition: if sameness of 
person entails sameness of mental states over time, then inter alia persons are tem-
porally located and have mental states. Possession of mental states, and engagement 
in intellectual activity more generally, are phenomena we get a handle on through 
attention to ourselves and other animals. It is far from clear what it would be to 
speak of these things outside of the context of animal life, or something like it (what 
we might call ordered systems susceptible to reasons). What could it be to perceive, 
or remember, or learn apart from the possession of animal life? Do we genuinely 
have a grasp of the concepts of belief or knowledge apart from their coming about 
through one of these prior states? If we accept (as I think we ought to) that emotions 
are contentful and an integral component of the reason-governed lives of persons,8 
then these provide a clear case of important mental states non-accidentally related to 
animal embodiment.
Here, then, is an expanded form of the personhood challenge: ‘human beings are 
the kind of things eligible for personhood because they are bodies inhabiting a world, 
susceptible to reasons that both flow from and guide their interactions with the world 
and with one another. It is because they fall within a certain subclass of the category 
of animals that human beings are thus eligible. Whilst we might imagine there being 
entities that are not animals which are nonetheless persons, these will be relevantly 
similar to animal persons. The maximal mereological sum is not such an entity’.
The dominant strand in the philosophy of religion dissents. Mackie begins 
his Miracle of Theism by agreeing with Swinburne about the personal and yet 
6 Which is not to say that intuitions don’t count for a lot. Kripke once remarked, ‘I really don’t know, in 
a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything’ (Kripke 1981, 42).
7 My own view is that the project of supplying necessary and sufficient conditions here, as opposed to 
merely necessary ones, is misdirected. I suspect there is a certain open-endedness built into the concept 
of personhood: what would we say if we met a Martian; is this a person? Recognising this, however, is a 
long way from saying that anything goes, as we shall see.
8 See, for instance, Nussbaum (2001).
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disembodied nature of their shared subject matter (Mackie will go on to deny that 
this subject matter exists, but for present purposes that is a minor detail9):
We know, from our acquaintance with ourselves and other human beings, what 
a person is—a person, as Swinburne explains in the ordinary modern sense. 
Although all the persons we are acquainted with have bodies there is no great 
difficulty in conceiving what it would be for there to be a person without a 
body: for example, one can imagine oneself surviving without a body, and 
while at present one can act and produce results only by using one’s limbs or 
one’s speech organs, one can imagine having one’s intentions fulfilled directly, 
without such physical means. (Mackie 1982, 1–2)
By a series of thought experiments, then, we can imagine what it is to be a disem-
bodied person, and so being animal-like can be no part of our concept of person-
hood. But we ought not to concede that we can imagine any such thing. We might 
very well imagine something which we take to be a case of being a disembodied 
person, just as we might imagine a situation which we would describe as being one 
in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus. In neither case, however, need we accept the 
description as veridical. Think about what it is like to imagine surviving without 
a body: you imagine ‘going on’ somehow after your death. Perhaps you imagine 
not seeing, or feeling your body: but do you still imagine seeing things? Are you 
situated (on earth or in ‘heaven’)? Is there thought happening? If so where? Do you 
locate it in your head, or rather where your head would be if you had a body? Our 
imagining of ourselves is intrinsically somatic and cannot be invoked to strip ani-
mality away from our concept of personhood.
What about ‘having one’s intentions fulfilled directly, without … physical means?’ 
Can one in fact imagine this? Suppose that I imagine intending that the pen in front 
of me levitate and that it does indeed levitate. What should we make of this? Note 
that the supposed scenario is not one in which I make the pen move by magic, say 
by performing some ritual, or even by repeating an incantation in my internal mono-
logue. Nor yet is it simply one in which I desire that the pen move and in which the 
pen proceeds to move; for sure if I intend that 휙 it must be the case that I desire that 
휙 to some extent, albeit that my desire might be regretful or otherwise non-absolute. 
Still there is much that any given person will desire without intending. Her desire 
might be that some distinct agent bring about a state of affairs through that agent’s 
own intentional and individual action, in which case it is not the case that the bring-
ing about of the state of affairs falls within the original agent’s intention. Alterna-
tively an agent might have contradictory desires, or desires that she recognises as for 
something wrong: in neither case will desire coincide with intention.10 How then are 
10 Objection: but God will not have contradictory desires or desires for wrong things. Reply: No doubt, 
but this is to misunderstand the dialectic here. Swinburne and Mackie think that we can by an act of 
imagination conceive of a disembodied person such as God is supposed to be. In particular, we are sup-
posed to be able to imagine disembodied intention on the basis of our own experience of intention; but 
then it is tying down intention in creatures such as ourselves that is of immediate concern.
9 See here Turner (2002).
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we to distinguish intention from mere desire? The lesson of Anscombe’s Intention 
is that intentional action is conceptually prior to intention (Anscombe 1957), and 
it is precisely a clear case of action that is lacking in the pen case. My body does 
not move with respect to the pen in a fashion that could be interpreted as an action, 
and to suggest that the movement of the pen is itself an action of mine is to beg the 
question. It is, we should conclude, through the intelligible movement of bodies that 
intentional action is to be delineated.
It might seem as though the pantheist is in a better position than Mackie and 
Swinburne here, since it is not obvious that her view is of God as disembodied (per-
haps a pantheistic deity has a maximal body.) But remember why the standard claim 
about God’s disembodiment was raised above: because if God is a person then, it 
seems, God is an animal (or something like an animal), but a disembodied God can-
not be appropriately animal like. For all the difference between the pantheist and the 
Swinburnian it is far from clear that pantheism can deliver that God is appropriately 
animal-like for personhood, or indeed that she has a body in the relevant sense.11 
The objections to the conceivability of Swinburne–Mackie style disembodied per-
sonhood are based in the centrality of animality to the intelligibility of key personal 
concepts: self-awareness and intentional action. But animality looks to be central in 
each of these cases because of the limitedness that comes with animality. An animal 
is part of the material world, but not all of it: hence she can recognise herself by 
distinguishing her body from what is not her body and act upon what is not her body 
by means of her intentional bodily movements. Animals are non-maximal material 
beings; the sum of everything might very well be material—supposing materialism 
to be true—it is certainly not non-maximal. There is nothing that it could recog-
nise as distinct from itself (in a sense of ‘distinct’ embracing not only the failure of 
numerical identity, but also lack of mereological inclusion), and no wider reality 
within which it could act.
In the next two sections, I will flesh out two particular cases of the worry that the 
maximality of God as conceived by pantheism disqualifies God from personhood: 
first that the possession of contentful states, itself having membership of a linguistic 
community as a prerequisite, is barred by God’s maximality, second that this maxi-
mality deprives God of a life context.
Language and content
If one is a person then one, at least potentially,12 stands in contentful states. Exam-
ples of such states are asserting that P, believing that P, entertaining that P, denying 
that P and so on. I do not distinguish here between what would usually be termed 
mental states and the state of performing a speech act, since I want to allow the 
11 Where ‘body’ is used not simply, as in physics, to designate some unit of matter but rather something 
like matter as organised to constitute a life. A corpse, for example, is a body in the former, but not in the 
latter, sense.
12 The proviso is intended to capture, for example, pre-linguistic infants.
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maximum amount of generality and do not want to foreclose prematurely on who 
or what counts as a person. We can now ask: what is required for the possession of 
contentful states? Here the philosophical literature divides into mind-first, language-
first and no priority views.13 On a mind-first view it is a pre-requisite for an agent’s 
possessing any contentful state that she possess some mental state. On a language-
first view it is a pre-requisite for an agent’s possessing any contentful state that she 
have some grasp of a language. No priority views hold that in order for an agent to 
possess any contentful state she must both possess some mental state and have a 
grasp of a language. The contention of the present section is that God, as conceived 
of by pantheism, cannot have a grasp of a language and so cannot, on either a lan-
guage first or a no priority view, be the subject of contentful states (and so, cannot 
be a person). This in itself is an unfortunate result for the pantheist, since it makes 
her hostage to the correctness of a mind-first account of content. Before moving on 
the main business of this section, however, I will note reasons for rejecting a mind-
first view of content. If these are cogent then, in the light of what follows, a panthe-
istic deity cannot be a person.
It is a familiar thought from the work of Kripke, Putnam and Burge that contents 
are not simply determined by the mental states of agents. That I mean dihydrogen 
oxide by ‘water’ is determined by the world and the linguistic community, and that I 
mean a disease of joints by ‘arthritis’ is determined socially. Recent work has drawn 
attention to the linguistic mediation of externalist content and developed an argu-
ment that this undermines mind-first accounts of content.14 If what my mental states 
mean is dependent, in a crucial class of cases, on the prior meaning of linguistic 
expressions then it cannot, on pain of vicious circularity, be that each of my linguis-
tic expressions has its meaning determined by the prior meaning of a mental state.
Suppose then that mind-first views of content are incorrect. Then if an agent is to 
stand in a contentful state, she must grasp some language. I’ll leave what grasping 
a language consists in deliberately unspecified here (what are the minimal require-
ments? Competence with how many expressions, say, suffices for one to count as a 
user of a language?).15 It is not the case that anything goes, though. In particular it is 
a constraint on linguistic competency that a language-user be a member of a linguis-
tic community. Why?
What would it be to be to have a grasp of some language  without being a mem-
ber of a community of -users? We can imagine an entity making noises indistin-
guishable from phonemes from  , but this no more counts as speaking  than the 
accidental arrangement of dust on a distant planet into a shape indiscernible from 
an English sentence counts as writing. To speak  is, in the first instance, to use it 
to communicate. Of course derivatively a speaker may talk to herself, it might be 
claimed that a person could have acquired a language in the Pickwickian sense that 
they possessed it from the first moment of their existence. Second, an alternative 
suggestion runs, they could acquire it privately. Consider the first case, what could 
13 For a helpful overview see Thornton (1998, Ch 1).
14 I have in mind especially unpublished work by Gail Leckie.
15 I happen not to think that there are neat answers to these questions, but that is for another day.
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possibly constitute the activity in which they are engaged when they exercise their 
knowledge-how16 as speaking a language in the absence of recognition by others? 
It is no good to note that their activity is governed by what, from the outside of the 
imagination, look like rules; how could it be established that they are in fact rules, 
as opposed to accidental or natural regularities in the absence of a legislative social 
context? We can hardly say at this point, ‘the person could have decided upon the 
rules herself’. We can imagine such a decision being proclaimed by a speaker, either 
aloud or in her internal monologue, but it is important to see that these forms of 
speaking (or ‘speaking’—the scare-quotes being non-optional—in the case of one’s 
internal monologue) are derivative. For in the absence of attestation in terms of the 
rules of a language, no speaker can be appraised of the content of an utterance, the 
inferential commitments it carries with it, or indeed even whether a sound is a gen-
uine utterance. Once a speaker knows how to follow the rules of a language, she 
can—as it were—play the game by herself, much as somebody might work through 
some chess moves alone in the privacy of her flat, but knowing how to play the 
game must come first. And the acquisition of knowledge how to speak a language is, 
of necessity, something that takes place in a community.
Suppose this were not so. There are two scenarios to consider. The first is that 
an entity self-legislate, enacting her own linguistic rules, which she then proceeds 
to follow.17 In the absence of prior linguistic resources it is wholly unclear what 
deciding upon rules could be: it certainly cannot be the case, for example that a 
non-linguistic agent says to herself, out loud or in her internal monologue, ‘I shall 
say “Red” whenever I am confronted by a particular stimulus’ since by hypothesis 
she lacks the resources to do this. It may be objected that she could get into the habit 
of making the noise “Red” whenever there is a red thing in her visual field. But 
what would make this noise part of a language rather than a simple physiological 
response, comparable to her clearing her throat in response to a tickle? What could 
make the difference here is the use of the noise to communicate, to give reasons to 
other persons. But by the nature of the case this is excluded.
Alternatively we might suppose that an entity could come into being already 
equipped with linguistic capacities.18 Surely this is at least possible, which suffices 
to defeat the worry that a pantheistic deity cannot be a person, because it cannot be 
a language user. Possibility claims, as we saw above when discussing immediately 
realised intentions, are treacherous. Suppose an entity appears, or is present from the 
first moment of time, and either makes noises or produces shapes such that we are 
tempted to describe it as a language user. What, however, could constitute its being 
a language user? By hypothesis the noises or shapes are not being used to commu-
nicate with other persons, so on the face of it we are in exactly the same position 
as that discussed in the previous paragraph. The only difference could consist in a 
16 We might ask, ‘knowledge-how to do what? What, in particular, distinguishes this from a nervous 
tick, or at least a voluntary making of mere noise?
17 c.f. here Anscombe on the equivalent in morality (Anscombe 1958).
18 In the sense of fully realised linguistic capacities, rather than, say, the predispositions towards lan-
guage described by a theorist such as Chomsky.
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brute fact that the ex nihilo practices of the entity are linguistic. Acceptance of such 
a brute fact amounts to an admission of defeat. It invokes a frankly magical under-
standing of language, entirely abstracted from the practice of communication, and 
this cannot be accepted.
It might be that an entity either start making noises or comes into being mak-
ing them, and subsequently encounters a community of language users, its noises 
being somehow interpretable by them. Over time it may be incorporated into the 
community and be appropriately described as communicating with them. It does not 
follow from this that the entities were language users prior to incorporation into the 
community. A plausible diagnosis of our undoubted tendency to think otherwise is 
that we tend to identify word tokens with sounds made by speakers, forgetting that 
sounds only constitute words in relevant communicative contexts.19
Possession of content, then, requires membership of a linguistic community. And 
no pantheistic deity could be a member of a linguistic community. For who would 
the other members of the community be? Certainly nobody wholly distinct from the 
deity, since by pantheistic hypothesis there are no such persons. Could it be then that 
God communicates linguistically with God’s proper parts? In order to assess this, 
we ought to be clear what is at issue. I might talk at one of my proper parts—‘oh 
silly foot, why are you hurting after only a few miles walking?’—but I am not com-
municating with it, it does not reply to me, providing me with reasons for its feeble-
ness with which I can then take issue. It is communication with a proper part, rather 
than simply talking at a proper part, which is required of God in order for divine 
possession of content to be compatible with pantheism.
What would it be for a person to communicate with one of her proper parts? She 
speaks (or writes, or sends a text message… ) and it speaks back, in ways that are not 
determined by her, and from which she can learn. What is being proposed here is some-
thing altogether more exacting that the familiar phenomenon of being taken aback by 
an aspect of oneself, or of challenging a thought in one’s internal monologue: these are 
indicators of the psychological complexity of persons such as ourselves. It remains the 
case that there is a single linguistic agent involved here. I might argue with myself in 
my internal monologue, but it is myself I am arguing with.20 To the extent that aspects 
of myself can surprise me it is precisely because they are that, aspects of myself—here, 
of course, the pantheist can claim a parallel, non divine persons are parts or aspects 
of God—but my surprise is not second-personal. In particular, when I engage with a 
surprising aspect of myself, a thought ‘out of nowhere’, the realisation of an emotion 
that disturbs me, I do not do so as with a conversation partner, meeting the reasons I 
introduce to the conversation with her own, distinct and perhaps contrary to my own.21
In conceiving of a divine person communicating with one or more of her proper 
parts, if indeed we can conceive of this, we are conceiving then of something remote 
from our own experience. The envisaged scenario is one in which a proper part of 
19 In other words, words—like states, money or genders are social entities.
20 The dialogal approach in contemporary philosophy of logic has as its starting point the primacy of 
interpersonal argument (Novaes 2016).
21 On the idea as conversation as the giving and receiving of reasons, see Brandom (1994).
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a person has reasons distinct from those possessed by the person in question and 
which may be articulated over and against that person. One parallel which might 
be drawn here is with social groups or organisations. The Labour Party possesses 
reasons (it has a reason to campaign hard for the local elections), but its constituent 
members also have their own reasons, which may be disjoint from or even compat-
ible with the Party’s (I have a reason to go on holiday before I go down with stress, 
and so I have a reason not to campaign hard for the local elections.) This certainly is 
an important feature of social groups, but there are many reasons that social groups 
have been considered not to be mereological fusions: treating them as such delivers 
the wrong results semantically, gives rise to difficulties about modal profile, and sits 
uncomfortably with our understanding of the concept of parthood, to sample a few 
of these reasons (Uzquiano 2004).
In fact here is good reason to doubt that anything could be constitutive of a part’s 
having reasons distinct from the whole of which it is as a part. Suppose that x is a 
person and y a part of x. y has a reason to 휙 . Can it be the case that x does not have 
a reason to 휙 ? It is surely flatly incoherent given the admission that x has a part with 
a reason to 휙 to say this. Rather what we should say is that x has a reason to 휙 in 
virtue of y, or in virtue of being y-ed, which may very well not be decisive, or be 
overwhelmed by countervailing reasons, but that it has a reason nonetheless. What, 
after all, could constitute y’s reason being distinct from any reason possessed by X? 
In the normal course of things we can recognise distinctness of reasons amongst dia-
logue partners through their having disjoint animal lives. That basis for distinction is 
absent here, and so unless there is another basis for distinction, we should not admit 
the possibility that the part’s reasons are not reasons for the whole.
To be a person God must have mental content; to have mental content God must 
be a language user; to be a language user God must belong to a linguistic commu-
nity. As conceived of by pantheism God cannot belong to a linguistic community. So 
if pantheism is true God is not a person.
Personhood and personality
Here is another case to the same effect. Being a person involves having a life; having 
a life involves having a life context. No pantheistic deity can have a life context, so 
no such deity can be a person. In the rest of this section I’ll cash out this case more 
slowly.
Personhood is, we might think, closely related to personality. In order to identify 
personal agency, and thereby interact with the persons behind it, we focus on the 
distinctive projects and concerns of the agent in question. The persons we encounter 
are some things, but not others, interested in some aspects of the world, but not oth-
ers. Peter is six foot tall, a nurse, cheerful, and likely to be seen at a disco on Friday 
nights; he is not a five-foot, sullen lion tamer. This limitedness, the fact that personal 
existence is non-maximal, appears integral to our concept of personhood. We know 
how to identify a person and deploy the concept appropriately because their prop-
erties and actions stand out against a broader backdrop of properties they do not 
possess and actions they do not perform. We might call this aspect of personhood, 
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which is part of what was described above as being appropriately animal-like, pos-
session of a life.22
The attribution of life has several distinct senses. There is a biological one (dogs 
have lives, rocks do not, viruses are a borderline case). That is not quite what is at 
issue here, which is something more like the capacity to contribute to a (true) narra-
tive in which one is a character (for which, in many cases at least, biological life is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition). Similarly there is an undoubted theological 
usage which attributes life to God (‘the living God’). The mere fact of this usage 
doesn’t, of course, establish that God has a life in the sense in which we are inter-
ested, which I take to be necessary for personhood. After all, for all that has been 
said so far, the theologies that make this attribution might be incoherent, claiming 
something of God with which other claims they make is inconsistent. As it hap-
pens, however, there is good precedent for taking God to have a life without claim-
ing that God has a life in the present sense. Aquinas, in STh 1a, Q18, a. 3, working 
on an understanding of a living entity as one that is self-moving, argues that God is 
supremely alive since he is not moved by anything else.23 Again, this is not the sense 
in which I am interested in God having a life.
A life, in this sense, requires a life-context, a backdrop to the organism’s engage-
ment with the world, the stage on which the life is lived.24 I now want to suggest a 
reason why this stage must be numerically different from the organism itself.
First, it looks to be important that any given organism does not exhaust reality, 
since it is parts of reality disjoint from the organism that permit us to understand 
the organism’s movements and utterances, the capacity for being thus understood 
being essential to these being actions. That he is running after the bus, or that she is 
shouting at the dog are constitutive of those actions being what they are. Indeed any 
act of running requires something on which to run, and any act of shouting involves 
making noise that travels beyond oneself, the air molecules one causes to vibrate 
being distinct from oneself. A kind of comprehensible intentional action necessary 
for personhood, then, might be thought to depend on the existence of something 
ontologically disjoint from the putative person in question.
But, the reply can be anticipated, doesn’t this supposition of a necessary connec-
tion between personhood and the existence of disjoint entities rely on restricting our 
diet of examples? What about actions performed on oneself—the scratching of one’s 
arm, the raising of one’s eyebrow? Here the (immediate) difference made by the 
action concerns a part of reality which is not disjoint from the agent, yet the action 
22 On the relationship, in particular, between animality and freedom, see Steward (2012).
23 Might a similar move be made with respect to the language of personhood? Might it be claimed that 
God is (truly, non-metaphorically) a person, it is just that she is a person in a different sense from that in 
which you and I are persons? This move is actually subtlely different from the thomistic one referenced 
in the many body of the text, since Aquinas is claiming that God is alive in a sense in which you and I 
are also alive, albeit to a higher degree. What is at issue in the personhood debate is, however, whether 
God is a person in the same sense in which you and I are persons. Thanks to a referee for raising this 
question.
24 As I use it here ‘organism’ is simply an expression applying to any entity possessing a life. I do not 
imply that all such entities are, for instance, carbon-based life forms.
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is no less an action for this being the case. If we’re tempted by this line of thought 
it is likely that we are imagining these actions being performed by persons such as 
ourselves in the context of a world that extends beyond our bodies. Here there can 
be no objection; we intentionally, as persons, perform actions upon our own bodies. 
The salient question is, however, whether movements of a body could be intelligible 
as actions in a context where no actions can be performed upon anything disjoint 
from the agent (because the agent exhausts reality). This, in my view, ought to be 
doubted.
It is, it seems to me, by comparison with actions performed upon the external 
world that actions performed upon an agent’s own body are constituted as such. It 
is in virtue of their resemblance to externally efficacious actions that movements 
of a body upon itself can be recognised as cases of a person acting, rather than of 
random or involuntary movement. The wider reality beyond the body provides the 
context in which movements may be interpreted meaningfully as part of a life. The 
agent, like the actor, requires a stage. Yet isn’t there a comeback available to the 
pantheist here? The existence of a wider reality may be epistemically necessary, 
in order that an agent’s actions may be identified as such, but it need not follow 
that this reality is a metaphysical condition for action; there could, the claim goes, 
be genuine actions which could not be identified. That this is a genuine possibility 
entails a thoroughgoing realism about action, there are cases of action which come 
apart from the applicability of our concept of action. But if this is the case then 
surely it is not our concept of action according to which the agent at issue can be 
said to act: what else, other than our application conditions associated with the con-
cept, could fix the truth-conditions for ‘a acts’? Appeal to baptisms by ostension and 
other devices familiar from the literature on natural kind expressions is not going to 
help in this case.
Tu quoque!
Up until this point I have argued that pantheism is incompatible with the claim that 
God is a person, that (1) and (2) above form an inconsistent set. It would be under-
standable, but hasty, to conclude on this basis that if we want to maintain both that 
God exists and that God is a person then we ought to embrace theism of the kind 
standardly discussed in analytic philosophy of religion (Swiburnian theism). This, 
I will now argue, is a mistake since the reasons pantheism is incompatible with 
divine personhood are also reasons Swinburnian theism is incompatible with divine 
personhood.
Recall the earlier quoted passage from Swinburne in which God is described as:
a person without a body (i.e. a spirit), present everywhere, the creator and sus-
tainer of the universe, a free agent, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), 
knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, 
eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. (Swinburne 2016, 2)
Call the conjunction of claims about God made here, minus the one that God is 
a person, Swinburnian theism. Swinburnian theism allows neither that God is a 
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language user nor that God has a life context. If these are reasons to reject the com-
patibility of pantheism with divine personhood, then, they are also reasons to reject 
the compatibility of Swinburnian theism with divine personhood.
First consider membership of a linguistic community (remember that we are tak-
ing this as a prerequisite for content possession). Here the Swinburnian theist might 
seem to be in a better position than the pantheist. For is it not usual for theists to 
talk of God speaking to non-divine agents, who in turn speak to God in prayer?25 It 
is; however this will not secure membership of a linguistic community of the kind 
required for divine personhood. First, divine speech to the non-divine and non-
divine speech to the divine are contingent realities. In particular, they depend on 
there being a non-divine reality. But God’s act of creation is supposed to have been 
unforced (God is, after all, a ‘free agent’). So God might not have been a mem-
ber of a linguistic community. But then God is only contingently a person. This is 
not a result likely to be welcomed by the Swinburnian theist, for whom personhood 
belongs to the essence of God.26
Yet not even contingent membership of a linguistic community looks safe for 
the Swinburnian God. That God is supposed to be disembodied and immutable. 
The capacity to use language on the other hand is an acquired bodily aptitude (we 
considered above the case of an agent who had never not possessed a language). 
God, by Swinburnian definition, does not have a body and cannot—as immutable—
acquire any aptitudes. It might be replied that, whilst God does not have a body, the 
entirety of creation constitutes a domain through which God can speak, bringing 
about events analogous with the moving of hands to write or lips to speak. If this 
route is taken, though, the Swinburnian theist finds herself in the same situation as 
the pantheist: there is nothing external to the ‘body’ which is deployed in speaking. 
We have seen already, in the case of pantheism, that this situation is incompatible 
with membership of a linguistic community.
Nor does Swinburnian theism allow that there is a stage on which God’s life is 
played out in the fashion required for personhood. God is ‘present everywhere’ and 
omnipotent. There is, then, nothing that lies beyond God’s remit and nothing which 
could not be God’s action.27 Just as in the case of pantheism there is nothing that could 
25 On divine speaking see, for instance, Wolterstorff (1995). But, for a striking denial from a biblical 
critic, motivated by a thomistic understanding of God see Brown (1981). This is noteworthy in that it 
calls into question the move from lived religion and its language of divine speech and revelation to meta-
physical claims about divine personhood.
26 A referee asks whether Swinburne’s social trinitarianism might be of help (Swinburne 1994). Cer-
tainly it seems that the suggestion that there are three divine individuals might provide a way to suggest 
that each divine individual could be part of a linguistic community; similarly the shared life of the Trin-
ity could furnish each divine person with a life context. I have profound doubts that once the details are 
filled in, social trinitarianism will be of help. Whether or not that is right, it is hardly a victory for the 
proponent of divine personhood that there could be (three) divine persons if Swinburnian social trinitari-
anism is correct. Even amongst Christian philosophers of religion Swinburne’s trinitarian theology has 
been the object of much criticism (Tuggy 2004; Clark 1996). I myself view it as a form of tritheism and 
so inconsistent with the Christian creeds of which it is supposed to provide an elucidation.
27 Swinburne himself would make an exception for the libertarian free actions of human agents. This 
does not look like it will secure enough for God to have a stage on which to act. For, at any time, any 
observed event could be a case of divine action.
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constitute an event as an action of God’s, in the univocal sense of ‘action’ whereby 
actions are performed by persons.28 Nor, for that matter, do the interactions described 
between the faithful and God in prayer have the form of an exchange between speakers 
of a shared language where each party can recognise a publicly accessible and com-
prehensible action of the other as an utterance in a language and respond accordingly 
to reasons put forward by her conversational interlocutor. God’s speaking to the pray-
ing person is not public; watching somebody in the act of prayer is sufficient to under-
stand this. Hearing the ‘voice’ of God is, for the believer, an often painful introspective 
process, which involves distinguishing thoughts, desires, and impulses taken to come 
‘from God’ from ones taken to be of no religious significance. To make these observa-
tions is in no way to undervalue prayer, but rather to recognise that it cannot be catego-
rised as a series of exchanges within a community such that God could be identified as 
a discrete agent with a distinct sphere of influence.
Swinburnian theism cannot deliver that God is a language user, nor that there is a 
stage on which God’s life is played out. It cannot therefore allow that God is a per-
son. Given that most Swinburnian theists wish to affirm divine personhood, they are 
in an inconsistent position. Consistency could, of course, be restored by abandoning 
divine personhood. We will now explore that avenue briefly by way of conclusion.
Conclusion
Pantheism is incompatible with the claim that God is a person. The greater part of 
this paper has worked through arguments to that familiar conclusion. However, as 
we have seen, those arguments also show that Swinburnian theism is incompatible 
with the claim that God is a person. Faced with these conclusions, the philosopher 
of religion has a number of options. She can try to find something wrong with the 
arguments, to show that they do not in fact show that pantheism is incompatible with 
divine personhood, or that Swinburnian theism is incompatible with divine person-
hood, or either. Alternatively she might become an atheist.
Perhaps more interestingly, however, the philosopher of religion might revise her 
conception of God in order to restore coherence. One way in which this task could be 
undertaken would involve modifying the conception so as to be compatible with divine 
personhood. I conjecture that this will prove difficult if not impossible. The reason that 
both pantheism and Swinburnian theism fell victim to the arguments assayed above is 
that both deny that God is an item in the world comparable to ourselves (for the pan-
theist, God is the world; for the Swinburnian, God transcends the world). It is very 
difficult to imagine a conception of God which is genuinely a conception of God for 
which this is not the case. Better, then, to revisit the claim that God is a person.29 Whilst 
approached within much recent philosophy as though it were something like an analytic 
28 I myself don’t want to deny that there is a sense of the word ‘action’ under which it is true to say 
that God performs actions. It is, however, not one which licenses the move from action to personhood. 
Extended discussion is a matter for another paper.
29 For an earlier case to the same effect see Thatcher (1985).
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truth, this has been questioned by a fringe of scholars, and as Brian Davies has pointed 
out it is of recent vintage within the history of religion (Davies 2016, 64–65). That God 
is a person is a dogma, in the Quinean rather than the ecclesiastical sense. An engage-
ment with pantheism could wake the philosophy of religion from its slumbers.
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